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HOMELESSNESS: ITS ORIGINS, CIVIL LIBERTIES
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
NORMAN SIEGEL*
I. ORIGINS
A. Displacement of Poor People by Urban Development'
RBAN areas in New York and across the country have under-
gone massive redevelopment over the past fifteen to twenty
years. A city or community in which large-scale luxury develop-
ment occurs may reap some benefits: The quality of the housing
stock may improve, additional business may be brought into the
area and the city's tax base may increase. However, development
also brings serious and substantial problems for poor people.
Low income people, and ultimately the society they live in, pay a
high price for redevelopment. Large commercial and luxury resi-
dential developments in downtown areas frequently result in a
decrease in the quantity of low-income housing and a displace-
ment of the poor.
In many instances, development projects directly displace
people from the site of the development. Even where there is no
direct displacement, reduced services, harassment and dramatic
rent increases may threaten tenants in nearby areas, thereby caus-
ing secondary displacement. The consequence of either situation
is that tenants are forced to leave their homes-often with no
place to go. A significant number of these displaced tenants who
happen to be poor become part of the ever increasing homeless
population.
In the early 1970s, many people in New York City lived in
Norman Siegel is the Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties
Union (NYCLU). This paper was delivered at Villanova Law School on Novem-
ber 3, 1990 and was a culmination and synthesis of speeches, testimony, articles
and presentations done on behalf of the NYCLU. Normal Siegel wishes to ex-
press his appreciation to Arthur Eisenberg and Robert Levy, colleagues at the
NYCLU and Steven Glauberman, a volunteer attorney, who all helped develop
formulations of the NYCLU positions stated in this paper; Joel Johnson for his
assistance regarding some of the footnotes; and Saralee Evans for her support,
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1. Substantial portions of this section of this Article previously appeared in
a column I wrote for the NYCLU newsletter, See Siegel, The Homeless Crisis in New
York, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES 2, Mar. 1986.
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Single Room Occupancy Hotels (SROs).2 The number of avail-
able SROs decreased markedly from the early 1970s through the
mid-1980s due to gentrification and redevelopment. During this
time period, New York City, mostly Manhattan, lost approxi-
mately 100,000 SRO units. s As the city did not adequately plan
for alternative low-income housing, many of the displaced be-
came homeless. In the early 1980s, a significant percentage of all
single adult shelter residents in New York City listed an SRO as
their last residence.4
The shelters maintained by New York City were not adequate
housing, and for many, were not even a safe, temporary alterna-
tive. Inevitably, many people rejected the city's shelters and be-
gan living in the streets, which they found safer and less
confining. Living in the streets was a poor alternative, but, to
their way of thinking, it was the best alternative they had.
Many people consider the displacement caused by urban re-
development to be no more than a harsh economic reality. I,
however, am persuaded that, at least in New York, an unfortunate
correlation exists between urban redevelopment and the displace-
ment of racial minorities. My experience on the streets of New
York City over the last five years has taught me that the homeless
in that city are predominantly people of color-Black or Latino-
with the overwhelming majority being Black.5
2. SRO dwelling units do not contain bathrooms or kitchens. Residents of
SROs share these facilities.
3. Finder, Experts on Homeless Push for an Old Idea: S.R.O's in New York, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (Manhattan accounted for majority of lost
SROs).
4. A 1984 study conducted by the City of New York Human Resources Ad-
ministration reveals that 14% of shelter residents questioned reported an SRO
as their last place of residence. An additional 17% responded that the street or
another shelter was their last home. CITY OF NEW YORK HUMAN RESOURCES AD-
MINISTRATION, THE HOMELESS IN NEW YORK CITY SHELTERS (1984). A 1980
study by the same agency reported that of the male shelter residents surveyed,
45% had lived in an SRO at one time in their life. CITY OF NEW YORK HUMAN
RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, PRELIMINARY REPORT: SERVICE GAP STUDY SHEL-
TER CARE CENTER FOR MEN (1980). It is fair to conclude that many of the 17%
listing a shelter as their last address in 1984 previously lived in SROs, but could
no longer say it was their last address.
5. A New York State report indicated that in 1983 approximately 90% of
the sheltered homeless family population statewide were persons of color (ap-
proximately 97% in New York City) and approximately 70% of the sheltered
homeless single adults were persons of color (approximately 80% in New York
City). NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, HOMELESSNESS IN
NEW YORK STATE, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (1984).
1064 [Vol. 36: p. 1063
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B. Deinstitutionalization of People with Mental Illness6
One of the common misconceptions about homelessness is
that the problem arose primarily as a result of deinstitutionaliza-
tion of mentally ill people. Well, a closer look reveals that the
problem is not that simple.
Anyone who has read Ken Kesey's book or saw the film One
Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest understands why, in the mid 1960s and
early 1970s, state after state adopted a policy of deinstitutional-
ization of the mentally ill. Thousands of people who needed psy-
chiatric help but who were not dangerous to themselves or to
society were locked in state facilities, sometimes for many years,
often under brutal conditions. While the given reason for such
confinement was treatment, in fact, treatment was almost never
provided by the institutions. Instead of helping people, the real-
ity for the confined became one of imprisonment.
In 1975, the Supreme Court of the United States in O'Connor
v. Donaldson7 stated: "In short, a State cannot constitutionally
confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable
of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of will-
ing and responsible family members or friends." 8 Resoundingly
rejecting the argument that a state may involuntarily commit the
mentally ill for aesthetic reasons, the Supreme Court in O'Connor
asked and answered:
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to
save its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are
different? One might as well ask if the State, to avoid
public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically
unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intoler-
ance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the dep-
rivation of a person's physical liberty. 9
State legislatures have reached the same conclusion. For ex-
ample, the New York State legislature has attempted to balance
the individual's right to autonomy with society's interest in pro-
6. Substantial portions of this section of this Article previously appeared in
an article I co-authored with Robert Levy. See Levy & Siegel, The Plight of the
Mentally Ill Homeless: Sweeping Them Off the Streets Isn't the Answer, CIVIL LIBERTIES
12, Fall 1987.
7. 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (action brought by patient against state hospi-
tal claiming that hospital was intentionally and maliciously depriving him of his
consitutional right to liberty).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 575.
1065
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tecting (and safeguarding against) individuals who are deemed a
danger to themselves or others, but refuse assistance. In enacting
the New York Mental Hygiene Law, '0 the legislature has expressly
drawn a constitutionally appropriate balance between these com-
peting interests. Individuals can be confined involuntarily only
upon proof of a mental illness that poses a substantial risk of seri-
ous physical harm to themselves or others. This risk of harm
must be demonstrated by actual conduct and must make immedi-
ate hospitalization appropriate. The threat of danger must be
"real and present"" and proof of dangerousness must be "clear
and convincing."12
During the 1960s and 70s, people were released from New
York State mental hospitals in large numbers.'5 Concomitant
with the release of massive numbers of mentally ill people, the
state promised to create community mental health facilities-half-
way houses and outpatient clinics-and to provide adequate
housing to accommodate the former mental patients.' 4 The state,
however, never fulfilled its promises, and few such facilities were
established.
In New York City and other metropolitan areas, some former
mental patients were placed in SROs with little of the social ser-
vice assistance that had been promised them. They later became
victims of gentrification when their SROs were torn down or con-
verted to luxury high-rise residential housing.
During the winter of 1990-91, the number of homeless street
people in New York City appeared to be larger than ever. They
could be seen sleeping on heating grates, sidewalks, park
benches, in store doorways, on trains, in subway stations and bus
depots, or simply walking the streets of New York.
II. CIVIL LIBERTIES PROBLEMS
As the 1980s progressed, the homeless population increased
substantially. An increasing number of homeless people became
10. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 1.01-9.59 (McKinney 1972).
11. In re Scopes, 59 A.D.2d 203, 205, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (1977).
12. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979); In re Scopes, 59 A.D.2d
at 206, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 913-14.
13. See NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT II OF THE
STUDY TEAM REVIEWING CHANGES IN NEW YORK STATE PSYCHIATRIC CENTER IN-
PATIENT TRENDS 5 (1979).
14. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, § 4, at 22, col. I (pursuant to reform of
mental health system, chronically ill patients were discharged from state hospi-
tals in belief that their treatment could continue more humanely in the commu-
nity; this did not occur).
1066 [Vol. 36: p. 1063
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visible on our streets, in our subways and in our parks. Their
greater numbers and increased visibility provoked governmental
responses that were replete with civil liberties problems. Some of
the civil liberties problems arose in the context of "quick fix" so-
lutions offered by municipalities. The following are just a few of
those quick fix solutions.
A. The Streets
As many cities began to look like Calcutta, demands were
made to "get them off the streets"-especially in the cold
weather.
1. The Billie Boggs Cases 15
I was co-counsel in the Billie Boggs cases.' 6 On the eve of
Labor Day weekend in 1987, New York City Mayor Edward I.
Koch announced that he was going to hospitalize "gravely dis-
abled" homeless people involuntarily, if necessary.' 7 The pro-
gram he established consisted of a psychiatrist, social worker and
two police officers who roamed the streets of Manhattan, picked
up homeless street people and confined them to a special twenty-
eight bed psychiatric ward at Bellevue Hospital. Central to this
program was the Mayor's order directing hospital officials to rein-
terpret the New York Mental Hygiene Law so as to permit people
to be picked up who were not presently dangerous to themselves
or others but who might be dangerous at some hypothetical date
in the "reasonably foreseeable future."' 8
The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) immediately
opposed the Mayor's plan, calling it an unauthorized rewriting of
New York State's mental health laws and a violation of basic con-
stitutional liberties.' 9 Civil commitment is, in the words of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "a massive curtailment of
15. Substantial portions of this section of this Article previously appeared
in an article I co-authored with Robert Levy. See Levy & Siegel, supra note 6.
16. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523
N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), appeal dismissed as moot, 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525
N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988). Robert Levy was lead counsel and Eric Freidberg was co-
counsel in the Billie Boggs cases.
17. Daley, New York Expands Treatment Policy for the Homeless, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
18. Id.
19. Siegel and Levy, Koch's Mishandling of the Homeless, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17,
1987, at A35, col. 1.
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liberty." 20 Government's exercise of this power must be limited
by statute and constitutional principles. Because it permitted the
confinement of nondangerous people based on mere speculation
about their future conduct, the Mayor's program conflicted with
the United States Constitution and exceeded the authority
granted to the Mayor by the New York Mental Hygiene Law.
In addition to the arbitrariness of the Mayor's extra-legal
commitment directive, the program offered no guarantee that
real help would be provided after pick-up and confinement. The
NYCLU feared, with reason, that confinement would not result in
real help, but rather in the removal of the victims from public
view. The past history of involuntary "hospitalization" confirmed
this out of sight, out of mind suspicion. It was no coincidence
that the program originally was targeted primarily for white, afflu-
ent neighborhoods in Manhattan below 96th Street on the East
Side and 110th Street on the West Side.21
Ironically, at the same time that commitment standards were
improperly lowered to allow commitment of homeless people
who may or may not have been mentally ill and dangerous, scores
of severely disturbed people who voluntarily sought psychiatric
help were routinely turned away from city hospitals or forced to
wait in emergency rooms for days, often strapped to wheelchairs
or stretchers, because there were no beds available.2 2 In fact, for
the past five years the NYCLU has been litigating in federal court
to require the City of New York to provide basic services for the
homeless mentally ill.23
One of the first people to be picked up pursuant to the
Mayor's program was a forty year old black woman named Joyce
Brown, who also went by the street name "Billie Boggs." Brown
called the NYCLU for help.
20. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972); see also, Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
21. See Stein, Koch Spars Over Homeless Issue, N.Y. Newsday, Nov. 16, 1987, at
5, col. 1.
22. See Lizotte v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 85 Civ. 7548
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (pending action brought by NYCLU on behalf of people who
voluntarily sought psychiatric help).
23. Id. Lizotte is a class action on behalf of individuals who have been invol-
untarily detained and handcuffed to wheelchairs for prolonged periods of time
in the waiting areas of New York City municipal psychiatric emergency rooms
because there are no inpatient beds available for them on the wards of city hos-
pitals. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and an order requiring defendants to
provide duly admitted psychiatric patients with a bed in a physically appropriate
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For more than one year, Brown had lived on the street at
Second Avenue between 65th and 66th Streets in Manhattan. She
kept warm by lying next to a steam vent that released hot air
twenty-four hours a day. She bought food with money she re-
ceived from friends in the community and from panhandling. On
October 28, 1987, a team of fifteen to twenty employees of the
new program picked her up and took her to Bellevue against her
will. Seeking to make her an example of the new program, the
city diagnosed her as a paranoid schizophrenic in need of
hospitalization.
Brown initiated a legal proceeding in which the NYCLU chal-
lenged her involuntary commitment. On November 12, 1987, af-
ter a three day hearing, New York Acting Supreme Court Judge
Robert Lippmann-in an eloquent, sensitive and well reasoned
decision-found that Brown did not have a mental illness likely to
result in serious harm to herself or others and ordered her re-
leased. TheJudge stated: "[T]hough homeless, she copes, she is
fit, she survives." 24 He further stated that "[fireedom, constitu-
tionally guaranteed, is the right of all, no less of those who are
mentally ill."'25 Judge Lippmann concluded:
Whether Joyce Brown is or is not mentally ill, it is my
finding, after careful assessment of all the evidence, that
she is not unable to care for her essential needs. I am
aware her mode of existence does not conform to con-
ventional standards, that it is an offense to aesthetic
senses. It is my hope that the plight she represents will
also offend moral conscience and rouse it to action.
There must be some civilized alternatives other than in-
voluntary hospitalization or the street. 26
On December 18, 1987, the appellate division, by a three to two
majority, reversed Judge Lippmann. 27
24. In re Billie Boggs, 136 Misc. 2d 1082, 1090, 522 N.Y.S.2d 407, 412
(Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), appeal dismissed as moot,
70 N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
25. Id. at 1091, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
26. Id. at 1091, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13.
27. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523
N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), appeal dismissed as moot, 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525
N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988). Justice Ross, with Justices Murphy and Sullivan concur-
ring, wrote:
[W]e find the clear and convincing evidence indicates that, while living
in the streets for the past year, Ms. Boggs' mental condition has deteri-
orated to the point where she was in danger of doing serious harm to
herself, when, on October 28, 1987, she was involuntarily admitted to
1069
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The case was argued before the New York State Court of Ap-
peals onJanuary 8, 1988. Then, onJanuary 12 and 13, a two-day
hearing was held before Judge Irving Kirschenbaum on the city's
application to medicate Joyce Brown against her will. The hospi-
tal wanted to give her Haldol-an anti-psychotic drug-three
times a day. She refused. On January 15, Judge Kirschenbaum
declined the city's application. He held that Joyce Brown had the
mental capacity to make a reasoned decision about her medica-
tion under the standards enunciated in Rivers v. Katz. 28 Judge
Kirschenbaum held: "There is no clear and convincing evidence
to support an order permitting the State to exercise its police
respondent Bellevue for treatment; and, based upon the entire record
and not selective portions thereof, we further find that clear and con-
vincing evidence supports the continued involuntary confinement of
Ms. Boggs to the hospital for treatment.
Id. at 366, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
Justice Milonas with Justice Rosenberger dissented by stating:
It is a tragedy that in our wealthy society so many people have been
driven to homelessness, and those of us who are more fortunate must
helplessly witness and feel their misery on a daily basis. Regrettably,
our affluent, sophisticated and medically advanced society has not de-
veloped a more rational, effective and humane way of dealing with the
mentally disturbed homeless than in a manner other than what appears
to be revolving door mental health-that is, forcibly institutionalize,
forcibly medicate, stabilize, discharge back into the same environment,
and then repeat the cycle. These ill and unfortunate citizens especially
deserve our sympathy since they are not only homeless, but hopeless.
Yet, they have shown extraordinary courage, strength and resourceful-
ness in their ability to survive in conditions where the "normal" person
would be unable to endure.
Fortunately, people of good will have become aroused, and we may
be approaching the time when the problem of the homeless will be con-
fronted with sincere and realistic attitudes and resources.
Committing Billie Boggs is not the answer.
Id. at 379-80, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 95 (Milonas, J., dissenting).
28. In Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74
(1986), the New York Court of Appeals held that the due process clause of New
York's State Constitution affords involuntarily committed mental patients the
right to refuse anti-psychotic medication. The court stated:
[N]either the fact that appellants are mentally ill nor that they have
been involuntarily committed, without more, constitutes a sufficient ba-
sis to conclude that they lack the mental capacity to comprehend the
consequences of their decision to refuse medication that poses a signifi-
cant risk to their physical well-being. Indeed, it is well accepted that
mental illness often strikes only limited areas of functioning, leaving
other areas unimpaired, and consequently, that many mentally ill per-
sons retain the capacity to function in a competent manner. Nor does
the fact of mental illness result in the forfeiture of a person's civil
rights, including the fundamental right to make decision concerning
one's own body.
Id. at 494, 495 N.E.2d at 341-42, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (citations omitted).
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power to compel the ingestion of drugs ....
On January 19, 1988, at 2:00 p.m., Joyce Brown, after being
involuntarily confined for eighty-four days, was released and
walked out of Bellevue. Consequently, on February 4, 1988, the
New York Court of Appeals issued a decision saying the case was
moot.3 0
2. Round-ups of People Sleeping on the Streets 3'
In 1989, a proposal was submitted to the New York City
Council which was designed to enact legislation that would au-
thorize city officials to pick up persons "found sleeping" in public
places and to take such persons to shelters, hospitals or their
homes-in the rare instances where such persons had homes.3 2
The NYCLU took the position that this proposal was unwork-
able and constitutionally suspect. Consider the alternatives of-
fered to the homeless by such a program. Under the proposal,
the homeless were to be taken either to a shelter or to a public
hospital. Public hospitals, however, were already over-taxed.
They could not adequately treat persons who voluntarily came in
seeking medical attention. The city shelters were, and are, seri-
ously inadequate in a variety of respects. They are dehumanizing
and dangerous places which homeless people avoid.
Furthermore, from a constitutional perspective, we believed
the proposal was troublesome. Pursuant to its provisions, city of-
ficials would have been permitted to pick up a homeless person
who was sleeping, but not one who was awake. Such a distinction
points up the absurdity of the program and exposes constitutional
problems that arise where, as here, government seeks to seize
people against their will.
The proposal implicitly recognized that the attempt to seize
people who are awake, based upon their dress and appearance, is
fraught with constitutional vagueness problems. But, if the city
cannot pick up those who are awake, then by what logic can it
29. In re Application of A. Sabatini, No. 95656-87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Jan. 15,
1988).
30. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520
N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S. 2d 796 (1988).
31. Substantial portions of this section of this Article previously appeared
in my statement before the New York City Council Committees on Housing and
Building and General Welfare, and the Select Committee on the Homeless on
Providing Care, Assistance and Shelter to Homeless Persons on March 9, 1989.
32. Peter Vallone, New York City Council President proposed the legisla-
tion in February, 1989.
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seize persons who are sleeping? In both instances, such a practice
deeply intrudes upon the basic constitutional right of liberty.
That constitutional right prevents government from seizing indi-
viduals against their will unless such persons are engaged in con-
duct that is harmful to themselves or others. 33 In most instances,
people who are sleeping on the sidewalk are engaged in no such
harmful conduct.
The vision of homeless people sleeping on the street or in
public facilities is undoubtedly disturbing and discomforting to
sensitive and concerned citizens, but society cannot escape the
homeless problem by sweeping it out of sight. Nor can it ignore
constitutional principles in addressing this tragedy.
B. Trains & Subway Stations
1. Begging/Panhandling4
Recently, in New York City, a major controversy arose over
the issue of begging in the subways. This came about because
homeless people were asking subway riders to help them out with
a quarter or a dollar.
The New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority (Transit
Authority) promulgated rules that prohibited individuals from re-
questing contributions in all facilities under its jurisdiction and
control. 35 A similar blanket prohibition against begging in the
Port Authority bus terminal and on the concourse of the World
Trade Center was promulgated by the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey.36
By contrast, no such blanket prohibition was imposed upon
charitable organizations that solicited contributions within these
same facilities. Some of the organizations that were permitted to
continue soliciting contributions may very well have been doing
so on behalf of poor or homeless people.
33. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
34. Substantial portions of this section of this Article previously appeared
in an amicus curiae brief filed by the New York Civil Liberties Union
Foundation. See Amicus Curiae Brief of New York Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
35. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 21, § 1050.6(b) & (c) (1990); see
also Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 345 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd in part, vacated in part, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516
(1990); Roberts, Subway Begging: Legal for Charity but Not for Poor, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 4, 1989, at B1, col. 1.
36. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 21, § 1220.25, (1990); Young, 729
F. Supp. at 347.
1072 (Vol. 36: p. 1063
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A federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of these
regulations, Young v. New York City Transit Authority,3 was filed on
behalf of homeless individuals. The district court addressed the
following set of circumstances. Representatives from organiza-
tions devoted to helping the poor were permitted-subject to
time, place and manner limitations-to solicit contributions
within New York City's transportation facilities'. Persons with no
organizational affiliation, however, were totally barred from ask-
ing for contributions within these same facilities, even though the
message conveyed by these poor people may have been virtually
identical to the message conveyed by the organizational
representatives.
Judge Leonard Sand of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York ruled that the solicitation of
charitable contributions was protected first amendment activity
and that, consequently, the blanket restrictions and prohibitions
against begging were unconstitutional. 38
When the Transit Authority appealed Judge Sand's decision,
the NYCLU filed an amicus curiae brief in the circuit court. We
argued that the blanket prohibition against begging in transporta-
tion facilities was unconstitutional for two reasons. First, the
equality principle of the first amendment forbids the Transit Au-
thority from permitting charitable organizations to solicit contri-
butions while excluding individuals without group affiliation from
the same expressive activity at the same public facility. Second,
the Transit Authority cannot achieve equality by banning solicita-
tion by all groups and all individuals at all times, because an abso-
lute prohibition against begging and solicitation would impinge
impermissibly upon first amendment rights of self expression.
Additionally, even if, in some circumstances, begging and solicita-
tion involve non-verbal conduct, such conduct amounts to sym-
bolic expression that is itself protected by the first amendment.
To us, whether begging was viewed as pure speech or symbolic
speech, it was nonetheless entitled to first amendment protection
that rendered the blanket prohibition against such expressive ac-
tivity constitutionally impermissible.
37. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 89 Civ. 7891 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
28, 1989).
38. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 360 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (court declared total bans on solicitation violative of first amendment, but
stated that reasonable time, place and manner restrictions would be acceptable),
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In advancing these arguments, the NYCLU did not insist that
the homeless had a constitutional right to solicit contributions in
any place and in any manner that they choose. For example, it
may be permissible for the Transit Authority officials to restrict or
even prohibit solicitation of contributions in the subway cars
themselves, so long as such restrictions are imposed on an even-
handed and uniform basis. It might also be possible for the
Transit Authority to enforce rules to prevent begging and solici-
tation from being pursued in an overly aggressive or intimidating
manner-though the development and enforcement of such rules
would require care so as to avoid problems of vagueness and the
correlative problem of conferring arbitrary and excessive discre-
tion upon the Transit Authority police officers.
We believe that begging can and must be understood as an
essential form of self-expression. Although often personally diffi-
cult for the speaker, these communications express his or her
need and his or her hope that others will respond with assistance.
It is an expressive, non-violent, verbal method of attempting to
survive and to deal with the exigencies of life.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
did not agree, however.39 The Second Circuit, in a two to one
decision, reversed Judge Sand. 40
39. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d. Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990). The majority (Judges Altimari and Timbers) con-
cluded that the prohibition against begging did not violate the first amendment.
Id. Judge Altimari stated: "Whether with or without words, the object of beg-
ging and panhandling is the transfer of money. Speech simply is not inherent to
the act; it is not of the essence of the conduct." Id. at 154.
Judge Meskill, concurring in part and dissenting in part concluded:
In sum, begging is speech protected by the First Amendment that
may be regulated, but not entirely prohibited, to achieve the govern-
ment interests advanced in this case. I recognize that the presence of
large numbers of beggars in the subway presents a serious problem for
the TA and contributes to the sense of chaos and frustration exper-
ienced by the many hard-working New Yorkers who rely on the subway
system. Had the TA's regulations continued to bar all charitable solici-
tation in the subways, I would uphold them because no public forum
would have been created. I simply fail to see why the TA should be
able to permit organized charities, but not beggars, to rattle a cup full
of change as one passes by.
Id. at 168 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. On November 26, 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari in Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
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2. Blocking the Free Movement of Persons; Lying on the Floor,
Platform, Stairs or Landings and Occupying More Than One
Seat 41
In 1989, the Transit Authority enacted regulations which
provide that "no person shall block free movement of another
person or persons; lie on the floor, platforms, stairs or landings,
or occupy more than one seat. ' '42 The NYCLU took the position
that the underlying policy of a rule which prohibits blocking free
movement of persons in a transportation facility and occupying
more than one seat was reasonable. What concerned the NYCLU
was how these standards would be applied and whether they
would be applied arbitrarily against poor and homeless people.
Would the rules be uniformly applied to the commuter standing
at the base of an escalator or stairway looking at the arri-
val/departure board and the homeless person standing quietly in
the same place with a sign requesting assistance and a cup for a
contribution?
Transit officials have a legitimate interest in assuring that
transportation operations run efficiently and accommodate the
many people who utilize the facilities. But, the NYCLU asked,
does furtherance of that interest require forcing homeless people
out of facilities and onto the streets? Could the rules be enforced
in a manner which would permit the Transit Authority to accom-
plish its legitimate interests without necessarily adversely affect-
ing the homeless? The NYCLU believes that only where
government can show that an individual's conduct substantially
interferes with the operation or use of the facilities for passen-
gers, or substantially interferes with the rights of passengers,
should that conduct be prohibited.
The cases that addressed the issue of sleeping on trains are
instructive. In New York, two longstanding cases provided that
individuals who were asleep on a train were not guilty of disor-
derly conduct under a statute directed at conduct with intent to
provoke a breach of peace. In People v. Sustek, 43 the court deter-
41. Substantial Portions of this section of this Article previously appeared
in my statement on behalf of the NYCLU before the Public Hearing of the
Metropolitan Transit Authority on the Proposed Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct and Safety of the Public in the Use of Terminals,
Stations and Trains of the Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company and the
Long Island Railroad on November 14, 1989.
42. Pitt, Rules Passed by Metro North Could Help to Rout Homeless, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 14, 1989, at B8, col. 5 (draft rules also banned such acts as washing oneself
at a drinking fountain and changing clothes at any Metro-North site).
43. 204 Misc. 514, 124 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Magis. Ct. 1953).
1075
13
Siegel: Homelessness: Its Origins, Civil Liberties Problems and Possible
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
mined that a disorderly conduct charge against a defendant sleep-
ing in a train or subway was untenable, because the defendant was
not found to be acting with intent to provoke a breach of peace,
but was engaged in the "involuntary act of sleeping or falling
asleep." 44 The observation of the court four decades ago contin-
ues to be valid:
[I]t is ... important that the rights of every individ-
ual, no matter how low his station in life, be safeguarded
and that he be given the same protection of the law, and
be surrounded by the same safeguards, that would of
right be given the loftiest citizen.
These defendants ... are human souls whose rights
may not be trampled on and against whom a nonexisting
offense may be used merely because they present a prac-
tical problem to the authorities in charge of our transit
system. 45
Similarly, in People v. Pickett,46 the court held that a person
who allegedly stretched full length on the seat of a subway car in
which there were about fourteen other passengers at 4:30 a.m.
and fell asleep, was not guilty of "disorderly conduct." The court
observed that "[t]o constitute disorderly conduct there must be
actual or threatened breach of peace." '47
The rules relating to movement of people in railroad facili-
ties are not premised on a disorderly conduct standard. These
earlier disorderly conduct cases suggest, however, that the con-
duct in question must be carefully analyzed to determine whether
it is affecting other citizens. Should a person lying across a train
seat at 4:00 a.m. in a relatively empty train be treated the same as
a person stretched out on a crowded rush hour train? The
NYCLU believes that the rules should be enforced carefully so
they do not become a mechanism principally used to harass
homeless people who are not interfering with passengers or rail-
road operations and to drive those homeless people from railroad
facilities.
The rules that prohibit people from lying on floors do not
specify whether lying on a floor in one of the many out-of-the-way
44. Id. at 516-17, 124 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
45. Id. at 515-16, 124 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
46. People v. Pickett, 21 Misc.2d 192, 193 N.Y.S.2d 953 (N. Y. App. Term.
1959).
47. Id. at 193, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
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"nooks and crannies" of Grand Central Terminal or Pennsylvania
Station at 2:00 a.m. would be treated in the same manner as the
same activity in a heavily travelled area of the facility at 5:00 p.m.
Is the government's interest in enforcement as compelling where
no one, including commuters, is interfered with or impeded? The
NYCLU believes that these rules should be relaxed, at a mini-
mum, during late night hours. Even if the rules could be viewed
as consistent with current due process and equal protection doc-
trines, it is the position of the NYCLU that these rules are unwise
and unnecessary as a matter of public policy and should be modi-
fied. These provisions appear to be specifically directed at the
homeless people who frequent railroad facilities and will inevita-
bly diminish the right of homeless people to survive. "The right
to basic subsistence is arguably the most fundamental of all
human rights. For a person who is starving and without shelter,
all other rights appear to pale in comparison." 48
The result of these rules will be that homeless citizens may be
hounded under the threat of arrest leading to a fine or imprison-
ment at a time when they have few, if any, viable alternatives to
provide for their own survival. At present, the federal govern-
ment, State of New York and the City of New York have each
failed to address the growing crisis of homelessness. They have
not provided adequate affordable housing, community mental
health facilities, drug and alcohol treatment facilities or a basic
working plan that contains the necessary commitment of financial,
physical and social resources to assist homeless citizens to achieve
and secure their basic right to survival.
3. Some General Observations Regarding the Right to Survive49
The government should not interfere with any individual's
right to survival. It must be recognized and understood that
homeless people who use Grand Central Terminal, Pennsylvania
Station and other railroad facilities do so only as a last resort.
Many homeless people have told the NYCLU and other organiza-
tions with concerns for homeless people 5o that they would rather
48. Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1032 (1984).
49. Substantial Portions of this section of this Article previously appeared
in my statement on behalf of the NYCLU before the Public Hearing of the
Metropolitan Transit Authority on the Proposed Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct and Safety of the Public in the Use of Terminals Stations
and Trains of the Metro-North Communter Railroad Company and the Long
Island Railroad on November 14, 1989.
50. The Coalition for the Homeless, the Doe Fund, the Partnership for the
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remain outside most shelters, even if space is available, because
conditions in the city's shelter system are so harsh and dangerous.
Paralleling the significant rise in the number of homeless
people in New York has been the increasing harassment of home-
less people by government personnel. Government helped create
the phenomenon of homelessness and should not and must not,
threaten the right of homeless citizens to survive. From the per-
spective of the homeless person who seeks to obtain quarters and
dollars from sympathetic fellow citizens in order to eat and to rest
for a few hours by sitting or lying in a railroad facility each day to
survive, it is unseemly for the officials of the railroad and the po-
lice to focus their energies and resources in this insensitive man-
ner. The NYCLU urges the government supported railroad
companies to channel their energies and resources into more
constructive and humane programs for the homeless. The rail-
road rules should not be used effectively to close one of the last
places of access and acceptable public space available to the
homeless. Rather, they should be used to seek a better way of
accommodating the needs and interests of the homeless.
Homelessness is a political, social and economic problem and
should be so recognized by the governmental entities. They
should not attempt to transform the homelessness problem into a
law enforcement problem.
The NYCLU believes that the rights and interests of both
commuters on railroad facilities and the homeless can be accom-
modated. They are not mutually exclusive. One group of citi-




In April of 1989, the New York City Parks Department pro-
posed to ban begging/panhandling in the parks. 52 Although the
constitutional analysis regarding this proposal is similar to the
Homeless, the United Homeless Organization and the Legal Action Center for
the Homeless are some of the organizations working closely with the homeless
in New York City.
51. Substantial portions of this section of this Article previously appeared
in my statement on behalf of the NYCLU before the Public Hearing of the
Department of Parks and Recreation of the City of New York on the Proposed
New Rules of the Department of Parks and Recreation on April 24, 1989.
52. Dunlap, Stern Seeks Expanded Rules to Curb Abuse of Parks in New York, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 15, 1989, at BI, col. 2.
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analysis of the prohibition of begging in the train system, it differs
in significant ways. It can be argued that the ban on begging in
the train facilities was, to some degree, influenced by the fact that
the train facilities are underground and that the trains and train
stations, unlike parks, are not traditional first amendment public
forums. Consequently, if a city parks department attempts to ban
begging-the New York City transit case (Young v. New York City
Transit Authority)-is not necessarily controlling.
In C.C.B. v. State of Florida,53 a total prohibition on all begging
or soliciting for alms in the streets or public places of the City of
Jacksonville was held to be "unconstitutionally overbroad by its
abridgement in a more intrusive manner than necessary, of the
first amendment rights of individuals to beg or solicit alms for
themselves." 54 The court stated:
Protecting citizens from mere annoyance is not a suffi-
cient [sic] compelling reason to absolutely deprive one
of a first amendment right ....
.... The City... is not entitled to absolutely pro-
hibit a beggar's exercise of his freedom of speech, but
the city may regulate that right subject to strict guidelines
and definite standards closely related to permissible mu-
nicipal interests . . .55
2. Loitering
Periodically, politicians and some citizens groups call for a
return to the "good old days"-when supposedly things were
more orderly. They sometimes advocate for anti-loitering provi-
sions. I fear we will be hearing more of this dynamic in the years
to come.
If an anti-loitering proposal is suggested in your jurisdiction,
the 1972 decision in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville will be in-
structive. 56 The observations of the Supreme Court of the United
States in striking down a Jacksonville, Florida vagrancy ordinance
in Papachristou remain compelling:
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms
of the ordinance-poor people, nonconformists, dissent-
53. C.C.B. v. Florida, 458 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
54. Id. at 48.
55. Id. at 50.
56. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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ers, idlers-may be required to comport themselves ac-
cording to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the
Jacksonville police and the courts. Where, as here, there
are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion
granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and en-
courages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for "harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting offi-
cials, against particular groups deemed to merit their
displeasure." It results in a regime in which the poor
and the unpopular are permitted to "stand on a public
sidewalk ... only at the whim of any police officer." 57
3. Sleeping and Lying on Park Benches
Some cities prohibit sleeping in parks or lying on park
benches.
At least one federal court held that the conduct of a person
sleeping in a public park was sufficiently expressive in nature to
implicate first amendment scrutiny. In United States v. Abney, 58 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit held that a federal regulation giving the superintendent of
the park service authority to grant permission to sleep in public
parks beyond the time limit specified was violative of the first
amendment. The court reasoned that the regulation contained
no narrow, objective and definite standards to guide such licens-
ing authority and, thus, failed to guard against the danger of arbi-
trary or de facto censorship.
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence,59 however, the
Supreme Court of the United States, while recognizing that sleep-
ing may be expressive conduct protected to some extent by the
first amendment, held that expression-whether oral or written
or symbolized by conduct-is subject to reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions. In that case, demonstrators on behalf of
the plight of the homeless in parks near the White House were
permitted to erect symbolic tent cities, but were refused a permit
57. Id. at 170 (citations omitted).
58. United States v. Abney, 534 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defendant ap-
pealed conviction under federal regulation that prohibited person from sleeping
in park with intent to remain for more than four hours).
59. 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (Community for Creative Non-violence and other
individuals claimed that National Park Service's denial of their request to sleep
in symbolic tents in Lafayette Park and on Mall in Washington, D.C., as part of a
homeless demonstration, violated first amendment).
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to sleep in such tents. The Supreme Court, stating its concern
that "camping" 60 in certain parks could cause damage to the
parks, upheld a National Park Service regulation prohibiting
camping in certain parks.6 1 Although the NYCLU disagrees with
the decision in Clark and believes that the government did not
justify adequately the abridgment of protected first amendment
expression, the rationale of the Supreme Court with respect to
the White House parks does not extend to lying down on a park
bench.
Even if the sleeping ban could be viewed as consistent with
current first amendment, due process and equal protection doc-
trines, it is the position of the NYCLU that these rules are unwise
and unnecessary as a matter of public policy.
The NYCLU strongly recommends that, notwithstanding the
provisions relating to sleeping and lying on park benches, modifi-
cations should be made in the enforcement of these provisions to
permit homeless people access to the parks during the pendency
of the homeless crisis. Alternatively, and less drastically, home-
less people should be permitted to use designated and regulated
areas of city parks that meet certain minimum size requirements.
Such areas would be made available to homeless people only dur-
ing designated hours (e.g., between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m.) for sleep-
ing and storage of a limited amount of personal belongings.
Accordingly, the homeless people would pose no threat or incon-
venience to other people using such parks.
The crucial issue presented by homelessness is whether,
prior to the creation of sufficient low cost housing and resources
for homeless people, we tolerate-in the interest of compassion
rather than coercion-people living and sleeping in the parks?
The NYCLU answer to this question is "Yes." The NYCLU
sees no reason why certain parks should not be open and avail-
able to accommodate all people, including those who are home-
less. We believe that, rather than prohibiting people from lying
down on a park bench, cities should give serious thought to less
drastic alternatives.
60. Defined as "(including the laying down of bedding for the purpose of
sleeping), or storing personal belongings, or making any fire, or using any tents
or ... other structure... for sleeping or doing any digging or earth breaking or
carrying on cooking activities." Id. at 290 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 299.
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III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 6 2
The challenge for all people, including federal, state and city
government officials, is to create viable options for the homeless.
The choices cannot be limited to living in the streets, arrest or
imprisonment against one's will in a psychiatric hospital. If viable
options are created,-e.g., low income housing, halfway houses,
drug and alcohol treatment facilities, drug education programs,
vocational education and employment training programs-then
many homeless people will jump at the opportunity to be home-
less no longer. It must be emphasized that shelters are not the
solution, because shelters are not homes.
To the politicians and the public I say: Let's stop, once and
for all, the demagoguery on these serious issues. Let's stop the
diversions that prevent us from focusing on government's failure
to create available affordable low income housing, viable commu-
nity mental health programs and drug treatment facilities. Let's
begin to address-constitutionally, legally and realistically-the
unacceptable homeless crisis which grows steadily worse.
Twenty-five to thirty years ago, people of good will expressed
their commitment to racial equality by sending activists and law-
yers to Southern communities to help protect the constitutional
rights of Blacks there. Today, the commitment to racial and eco-
nomic equality means that we must send activists and lawyers into
our urban streets, train and bus stations, and parks to learn about
the problems of the homeless and to seek solutions to this horri-
ble situation.
Economic justice requires focused attention and intense con-
sideration. It is long overdue. The spirit and advancement of
political and social rights during the civil rights movement and
over the following decades now must be expanded into the eco-
nomic rights area.
The measures noted below should be taken if we are to re-
solve the homeless crisis:
1) Create more affordable low income housing-and the
sooner the better.
2) Rehabilitate abandoned, boarded up and in rem buildings
and begin to use these buildings as viable housing.
3) Develop and implement remedial measures which would
ameliorate the harsh impact of urban redevelopment on housing
62. Substantial portions of this section of this Article previously appeared
in a column I wrote for the NYCLU newsletter. See Siegel, supra note 1.
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available to the poor. I believe government-the city, the state,
and the federal government-has failed to provide meaningful
housing programs for people displaced by redevelopment. In
fact, during the 1980s, the federal government substantially re-
duced housing funding to the states. One measure worth explor-
ing is a housing development trust fund. Developer
contributions to such a fund could be tied to the number of resi-
dential units being constructed, or to the amount of commercial
space that would be leased at market rates. Such a program
would likely reduce a developer's profit or alternatively he or she
might increase the cost of the market (often luxury) space being
constructed. In either case, parties who reasonably can afford the
contributions would be, in effect, subsidizing low income housing
that is so desperately needed. Economic channeling of this na-
ture seems only fair, however, when one understands that the de-
velopment is a direct and demonstrable cause of the displacement
and dislocation.
4) Create an experimental voluntary jobs training program
for the homeless. My experience with the homeless has led me to
conclude that most of them are unemployed and many could be
trained and made employable.
5) Establish a constitutional right to counsel in landlord-ten-
ant cases where the tenant faces eviction. The sixth and four-
teenth amendments mandate the right to an attorney in criminal
cases. We should expand the right to counsel principle to such
civil matters as landlord-tenant proceedings. Today, too many
tenants are without counsel when they confront a landlord (who
usually has counsel) in housing court. The consequence of not
having a lawyer is often homelessness. In New York City, there
are approximately 28,000 evictions each year. Due process of
law-fairness-requires that tenants facing eviction be provided
an attorney. 63
6) Convey a positive message to and about the homeless.
63. In February, 1989, the NYCLU, American Civil Liberties Union, Legal
Aid Society of New York, New York Legal Services and the law firm of White &
Case filed Donaldson v. State, 156 A.D.2d 290, 548 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1989), appeal
denied, 75 N.Y.2d 1003, 556 N.E.2d 1115, 557 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1990). Donaldson is
a class action on behalf of indigent tenants who are, or will, be faced with evic-
tion as a result of summary proceedings in the Housing Part of the New York
City Civil Court, who cannot afford counsel, and who are therefore unrepre-
sented by counsel. Id. at 290-91, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 677. Plaintiffs claim that the
failure to provide counsel to indigent tenants in eviction proceedings violates:
state and federal constitutional due process and equal protection principles;
common law privileges incorporated into article I, § 17 of the New York Consti-
tution which requires the State to provide for the aid, care and support of needy
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The key to any effective policy regarding homelessness is a dem-
onstration by the federal, state and city governments that they
care about each homeless person's situation. Government offi-
cials should meet and talk with homeless people. They should
find out who these people are, why they are there, and what, if
anything, government can do for them in the short and long
terms.
I have learned a great deal about homelessness and its causes
by going out and talking with homeless people. City, state and
federal administrations would also learn a great deal if their key
personnel were to spend time at places where homeless people
congregate. Perhaps most importantly, they would convey to the
homeless that the city, state and federal governments care and
want to help. Compassion must be shown by government and
citizenry alike.
All of us should become more involved in the issues of the
homeless and in the subject of economic rights, primarily focus-
ing on poor people. Our involvement in these issues is essential
to the resolution of the desperate situation of the homeless peo-
ple among us. Hopefully, we can make a difference. It is impera-
tive that we make a difference.
persons; and New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules permitting the assignment
of counsel to poor persons (N.Y. Cxv. PRAC, L. & R. 1102(a) (McKinney 1976)).
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